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A number ofprominent popular science writers have recently argued for the active appro-
priation of scientific language in the formulation ofmodern ideologies and ethical systems. A
critical examination of scientific narratives in light of contemporary theories of metaphor and
relevance suggests that scientific language indeed harbors the same emotive potential that is
traditionally ascribed to religious language, and can exhibit potent transformative effects in
shaping human thought. Also highlighted through this approach are the challenges ofconstruct-
ing scientific metaphors that are generally meaningful, accurate, and ethically responsible.
The true evolutionary epic, retold as
poetry, is as intrinsically ennobling as
any religious epic. Material reality
discovered by science already possesses
more content and grandeur than all
religious cosmologies combined....
Homo sapiens is far more than a
congeries of tribes and races. We are a
single gene pool from which individuals
are drawn in each generation and into
which they are dissolved the next
generation, forever united as a species
by heritage and a common future. Such
are the conceptions, based on fact, from
which new intimations of immortality
can be drawn and a new mythos
evolved. 1
-Edward O. Wilson,
Consilience [1998]
Personal reverie and "grandeur" aside,
E. O. Wilson has proposed here a rather strik-
ing program for the intimate association of
scientific "fact" and human ideology. And
although he may be one of the most influen-
tial and visible proponents of such a pro-
gram, he is certainly not alone. A number
of prominent science writers have recently
added their voices to the argument for the
value of scientific understanding in the for-
mulation of worldviews and ethical systems. 2
Their position suggests a growing convic-
tion within the scientific community that
scientific language might reasonably vie for
a position alongside religious language (if
not, as Wilson explicitly indicates, wholly
replacing it) in the role of informing mod-
ern ideologies. Clearly such claims hold
important implications for the dialogue be-
tween science and religion and for the popu-
lar conception of the roles these two disci-
plines assume in the shaping of human
thought.
The role that religion plays in shaping
ideologies and ethical systems has been
widely explored and has been portrayed by
some scholars as its primary function. In
The Interpretation of Cultures, Clifford
Geertz talks of religions as symbol systems
that provide models of reality, as well as
models for reality, by establishing "power-
ful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and
motivations." 3 Religious symbol systems
not only tell adherents what reality is like,
but also provide the structure by which they
inform their activity within that reality. A
number of detractors have claimed that
Geertz' characterization of religion as a
whole is insufficient; for the present pur-
poses, however, it seems that Geertz offers,
at the very least, a great deal of insight into
the function of religious language in shap-
ing human thought. The comparisons that
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Wilson invites between scientific and reli-
gious language suggest that scientific lan-
guage, too, might be profitably thought of
in this light. Indeed, Wilson's arguments
seem to imply that scientific language might
serve the very function that Geertz outlines
for religion. Certainly in the passage cited
above Wilson appears to be suggesting that
the facts of the evolutionary narrative might
not only provide a framework for the under-
standing of "material reality," but might also
serve to establish such "moods and motiva-
tions" that inform human activity in the
world. Wilson ultimately applies this for-
mulation to suggest explicitly that scientific
fact can inform ethical systems—in other
words, that scientific language not only
serves the straightforward function of pro-
viding a model o/the world, it also provides
a model for the world.
The complex interaction between reli-
gious language and personal ideologies has,
in more recent years, been the subject of a
great deal of study, not least in theologian
Can scientific language really hope to
provide the kind of meaningful models
for human attitudes toward the world
that are traditionally ascribed to religious
language? How can scientific "facts" be
translated into language with positive
transformative power?
Sally McFague's seminal examinations of
the role of religious metaphor.4 Similarly, a
number of texts have considered the role that
scientific language plays in the development
of scientific theories. 5 Although these latter
works have reflected on the role of models
and metaphors within science, the implica-
tions of such language for popular ideology
outside of science are largely not addressed.
What is required is a critical assessment of
such arguments as Wilson's. Can scientific
language really hope to provide the kind of
meaningful models for human attitudes to-
ward the world (assuming that one of
science's most widely accepted functions is
to provide models of the world) that are tra-
ditionally ascribed to religious language?
If so, what responsibilities does science have
in forwarding particular narratives as aspects
of a "new mythos"? In particular, how can
scientific "facts" be translated into language
with positive transformative power?
It is the aim my aim here to attempt to
address such questions. The first section ex-
amines both the extent to which scientific
language is capable of informing ideology,
and the active role that science must play in
proffering scientifically informed world-
views. Contemporary theories of metaphor
and relevance will be employed in an attempt
to evaluate accurately the potential efficacy
of scientific metaphor in shaping popular
thought. The second section explores these
findings in the context of a case study, by
considering the scientific theory of
geophysiology (more popularly known as
Gaia theory) and its
ramifications for under-
standing metaphor as a
link between science
and popular thought.
By exploring these top-
ics it may be possible to
move the discussion of
scientifically informed
ideologies toward a
more thorough under-
standing of how science
can positively play a role in the influence of
contemporary worldviews.
Scientific language in light of theories of
metaphor and relevance.
The importance of metaphor in the com-
munication of theory within the scientific
community is frequently noted, and many
scholars have pointed to the futility of in-
sisting that science make greater attempts to
eschew figurative language. This futility is
perhaps not surprising, given the ubiquity
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of metaphor; as linguistic theorist Andrew
Goatly writes, "metaphor is not something
that can be easily confined, but is an indis-
pensable basis of language and thought." 6
More importantly, however, philosophers of
science and linguists alike have also empha-
sized that metaphor provides an essential
function in scientific inquiry, contributing
most obviously to the fertility of scientific
theories. 7 Thus, it is to some extent the am-
biguity and vagueness of scientific language
that provides what Ian Barbour calls "a con-
tinuing source of possible applications, ex-
tensions, and modifications of theories." 8
Similarly, metaphor must play a vital
role in the communication of scientific un-
derstanding beyond the boundaries of aca-
demic science. Here also the necessity of
metaphor is apparent. A recent survey of
metaphor content in a variety of written and
spoken language genres shows that in popu-
lar science writing 1 8% of the total language
can be characterized as active metaphor. 9
(Compare this figure to values such as 28%
for modern novels, 10% for conversation,
and 4% for national news reports. ) But what
is the function of such metaphors? Do they
simply provide the best approximation of sci-
entific theory that is accessible to a popular
audience? Or can they, as Wilson suggests,
actively inform popular attitudes toward the
world/
On one level, metaphor can simply be
understood as "an invitation to make com-
parisons." 10 The propositional form that the
metaphor takes differs in some way from the
referent of the metaphor, forcing an assump-
tion on the part of the listener that these two
things have some identifiable commonality."
Thus, the proposition, "he flew from the
room," invites an assumption that something
about this individual leaving the room is
similar to the act of (say, a bird ) flying. The
interpreted thought (the individual leaving
the room) differs in a concrete way from
what is proposed in the structure of the meta-
phor (the individual "flew"), but stimulates
a comparison between the two forms. Spe-
cifically, "the metaphorical meaning ['he
flew'] does not belong to the target item's
[the individual leaving the room] field of ex-
perience, or domain." I2
In light of this characterization of meta-
phor, Wilson's statement that "we are a single
gene pool" is seen not to be a literal obser-
vation, but a metaphorical one. Clearly there
are concrete differences (embodiment, cul-
ture, society, to name a few) that exist be-
tween the human species as a whole and the
set of alleles that constitute its "gene pool."
But Wilson's metaphor constructs a situa-
tion in which the reader is forced to recog-
nize that there are similarities between these
two entities. (It is interesting to note that
"gene pool" itself is a metaphorical construc-
tion, one which Wilson plays off of elo-
quently in his language of "drawing from"
and "dissolving into.") The experience or
domain of humanity does not include the ex-
perience of being a "gene pool" (whatever
that experience might be), any more than the
experience of any single individual includes
the experience of "flying" from a room.
How is it, then, that metaphorical con-
struction alters the meaning of the literal
proposition? In one sense, the meaning of
the metaphorical statement is increased by
its intended implicit information content. 13
In the previous example, the verb "flew" im-
plicitly informs the listener's conception of
how this individual left the room; thus "he
flew from the room" might change the in-
terpretation of the proposition from "he left
the room" to "he left (swiftly) from the
room." The most important aspect of this
implicit information content, however, is that
it produces an emotional effect in the listener
that alters the meaning of the proposition. 14
The proposition "he flew from the room"
conveys emotional content that is lacking in
the literal and emotionally neutral proposi-
tion "he left the room." Such emotional con-
tent may be ambiguous; in this particular
context, it depends most obviously on
whether the individual is flying from some-
thing or flying to it. Nevertheless, the meta-
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phor possesses emotional information that
is absent from the literal proposition.
This discussion may provide some in-
sight into what exactly is intended in
Wilson's description of humanity as "a single
gene pool." The metaphorical construction
is calculated to provide implicit information
with emotional content. Specifically, the lan-
guage of the gene pool is meant to introduce
content of inclusiveness and unity that Wil-
son apparently sees lacking in other propo-
sitional constructions of the form "human-
ity is...." Individuality is lost in the "gene
pool"; the comparisons are implicitly drawn
between the human species and an entity in
which the "individual" (the set of genes pos-
sessed by a single human organism) is re-
duced to a transient subset of the whole. The
emotional content of the concept of such
intimate unity (so intimate that the indi-
vidual, in our common-sense definition, no
longer exists) is central to Wilson's use of
the metaphor.
One further aspect of metaphor deserves
consideration in the context of this discus-
sion. Linguists have devoted a great deal of
study to the pervasiveness of ideological
metaphor in human communication. The
emotive content of metaphor suggests that
metaphorical constructions (and arguments
from analogy in general) possess the capa-
bility of influencing attitudes and informing
human activity. They "seem to be embed-
ded in the sphere of human activity in the
world. They argue for doing something." 15
This persuasive aspect of metaphorical lan-
guage has been recognized not only in terms
of literary metaphor,"1 but also in terms of
common language and the emotive and con-
structive (or destructive) power of "root
analogies." I7 Such analogies are deeply em-
bedded in human linguistic constructions,
and powerfully inform human attitudes and
activity. One striking example, cited by
Goatly, 18 is that of the analogical equivalence
of "first" and "important" (as evidenced in
the common saying, "First things first") and
the influence that such a root analogy has
had on global politics in reference to the
metaphor of "Third World countries."
This emotive power of metaphor to
shape attitudes and induce activity is at the
root of Wilson's use of the "We are a single
gene pool" metaphor. The implicit and emo-
tive information content of the metaphor is
not simply intended to convey the equiva-
lence of humanity with Wilson's view of a
unified, non-individualistic entity. It is, by
extension, meant to induce people to act in
response to this implicit information in a
manner that reflects that unity. This is ulti-
mately the intention of Wilson's adoption of
such evolutionary metaphors; the "facts" of
evolution, imparted with emotive power
through metaphorical construction, are in-
tended to inform an ethical system in which
humans act in a manner consistent with their
common genetic heritage and future.
By now, however, it may appear ob-
vious that some other considerations must
be made in evaluating scientific metaphor.
Specifically, although for Wilson the con-
cept of the "gene pool" is connected emo-
tionally with concepts of unity, heritage,
and even "immortality," one might won-
der just how much of this intended implicit
information content is transferable to the
reader of the text. Clearly, this all depends
very much upon who that reader is. Rel-
evance theory is an area of research de-
signed to assess the theoretical interaction
between information and its interpreters,
and has been applied to the investigation
of metaphor in the context of its ability to
inform the reader or listener. At the most
basic level, relevance theory states that in-
formation gains relevance for an individual
through interaction with that individual's
personal thoughts and beliefs. 19 However,
a good deal more sophistication enters into
the calculus of just how such interaction
occurs. Sperber and Wilson provide one
of the most straightforward methods of as-
sessing relevance in terms of two separable
means in which information interacts with
the specific individual's thoughts and be-
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liefs.20 The first of these is described by
the "contextual effect" of information. The
greater the contextual effect, the greater the
relevance. To provide a simplistic illus-
tration, the statement, "The orchestra built
a cathedral of sound," might provide a great
deal of meaning to someone intimately fa-
miliar with religious architecture; some-
what less to an individual who has seen
photographs of cathedrals but never been
inside one; and virtually nothing to some-
one who replies, "What's a cathedral?" In
order to be relevant, the domain of the
proposition must have some referent within
the domain of the interpreter of the propo-
sition.
The second influence on relevance is the
"processing effort" required actually to un-
derstand the proposition, which relates to the
complexity of the proposition and that of the
concepts embedded within it. The metaphor
above ("cathedral of sound") requires rela-
tively little processing effort, although it
might be considered more difficult to process
Although for Wilson the concept of the
"gene pool" is connected emotionally
with concepts of unity, heritage, and
even "immortality" one might wonder
just how much of this intended im-
plicit information content is transfer-
able to the reader of the text.
than the previous example ("He flew from the
room"), if only for the potential difficulty in
digesting the concept of a "structure of sound."
This processing effort relates in an inverse
manner to the relevance of information: the
greater the processing effort, the lower the rel-
evance. Thus, relevance can be represented
in total as proportional to the contextual ef-
fect divided by the processing effort.
What becomes immediately obvious is
that scientific metaphor (at least in the con-
text of extradisciplinary communication of
information) most often concerns itself with
inherently high processing effort. The lan-
guage of much contemporary science is
highly technical and highly specialized; for
individuals unfamiliar with a particular sci-
entific discipline, the effort required to pro-
cess information from within that discipline
is potentially enormous. Thus, it has been
observed that the language of popular sci-
ence (which is, by definition, communicat-
ing outside the discipline) requires a con-
certed effort on the part of the scientist ("ad-
dresser time"), in order to provide meta-
phorical constructions that require relatively
little processing effort ("addressee time"). 21
Considering the language of academic sci-
entific journals, one would expect this im-
balance to shift markedly to the other side,
with a great deal more addressee time re-
quired and a great deal less expenditure of
addresser time to simplify the language in
which the information is conveyed. 22
This requirement for
active reduction of process-
ing time in popular scien-
tific literature has led to an
unusually high utilization of
the particular form of meta-
phorical construction
known as the transfer meta-
phor. 23 Transfer metaphor
represents the greatest de-
gree of dissimilarity be-
tween the metaphoric
proposition and its specific
referent; it is a heuristic tool
for transferring difficult-to-process informa-
tion into an easily processed form. A typi-
cal scientific transfer metaphor (familial- to
anyone who has gone through a basic cell
biology course) is the statement that "the mi-
tochondrion is the power plant of the cell."
There is virtually nothing at all that is simi-
lar between a mitochondrion and a power
plant, with the exception that, in both, raw
U
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materials are converted into usable energy
forms. But this one similarity is the very
point that the metaphor wishes to stress; and
by executing the transfer, the complicated
biochemical and cell biological entity, "mi-
tochondrion," is made available in a form
that is more accessible to the non-biochem-
ist. Transfer metaphor, in general, is a highly
utilized form of metaphor; in the survey of
genres mentioned above, transfer metaphors
represent on average 70% of all metaphori-
cal language. In the case of popular scien-
tific writing, however, this number skyrock-
ets to 97%; virtually all metaphorical lan-
From its inception, Gaia theory has
not only played an important role in
informing scientific research on plan-
etary ecosystems and global homeo-
stasis, but has also served as an un-
usually complex modelfor the role of
metaphor in scientific discourse.
guage in this genre requires such radical
reconceptualization.
All of these forces are at work in
Wilson's constructive use of the "gene pool"
metaphor. "Gene pool," as a scientific con-
cept, represents a description of the set of
alleles among the reproductive members of
a given population (in the case of "human-
ity," that population being the species, Homo
sapiens). It is also intimately linked with an
understanding of how allelic frequencies
contribute to the genetic composition of that
population. The introduction of the concepts
of alleles assumes some sophistication in
processing, requiring some understanding of
how individuals contribute statistically to the
overall allelic population. The metaphor of
the "gene pool" does more than just simplify
the language. The set of alleles concerned is
not literally a "pool" any more than the money
collected for a little intra-office gambling on
the NCAA championships is literally a
"pool." But in both cases, the metaphor en-
courages the recognition of conceptual simi-
larities that provide implicit meaning to the
proposition. The "pool" is something into
and out of which something tlows, whether
it is money or the particular set of alleles that
can be ascribed to one reproductive indi-
vidual. It is this conceptual bridge that Wil-
son seeks to build in utilizing the metaphor;
and, thus, by transferring a relatively com-
plex scientific concept into a relatively simple
and easily processed metaphor ("pool"), he
is able to increase greatly the relevance of
his statement to the general
reader. The implicit depiction
of individuals flowing into and
out of a more or less constant
"pool" that is humanity is pow-
erfully emotive, and designed
to induce moods and attitudes
appropriate to the feeling of
unity and flow implied in the
metaphor.(The question of contex-
tual effect, I think, remains
more elusive. How does the
metaphor of the "gene pool" interact con-
textually with the thoughts and beliefs of the
reader? The "pool" metaphor generally pos-
sesses high contextual effect, even for a gen-
eral audience. Nevertheless, for some indi-
viduals (e.g., those with relatively little fa-
miliarity with the concepts of evolutionary
biology and unsure as to how humanity
might relate to its gene pool), the metaphor
may be less contextual, and may lack rel-
evance, despite the efforts of Wilson to re-
duce the processing effort. For others (e.g.,
individuals like Wilson himself, fluent in the
language of evolution and possessing an in-
tuitive understanding of these concepts), the
contextual effect may be great. There may
also be other factors, beside familiarity with
scientific concepts, that determine the con-
textual effect of the metaphor. It is interest-
ing to note here that, even within the aca-
demic study of science, a variety of differ-
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ent metaphors have been adopted to explain
the same observations. The cultural influ-
ences on the development of such metaphors
in evolutionary biology have been noted, 24
and it is not difficult to see that contextual
effect has played the major role in determin-
ing which metaphors have been adopted by
which individuals (or groups of individuals),
despite the arguable equivalence in the ef-
fort required to process these metaphors. In
any case, a great number of factors may con-
tribute to the contextual effect of a given sci-
entific metaphor, and the overall effect may,
therefore, be difficult to predetermine.
It appears that theory of metaphor and
relevance can, initially at least, support
Wilson's assertions regarding the possibil-
ity of scientific language serving transfor-
mative functions, providing that the lan-
guage is actively metaphorical. This sup-
port stems from the very nature of metaphor,
which serves to provide emotionally laden,
implicit information that is capable of gen-
erating attitudes toward reality and, ulti-
mately, of informing human activity. It is
interesting that Wilson explicitly acknowl-
edges the importance of metaphor in this
respect, appealing to scientific concepts "re-
told as poetry." This point must be stressed.
It is not enough to say that scientific "fact"
alone can serve the function that Wilson ad-
vocates. Literal scientific language (or lit-
eral language of any sort) does not neces-
sarily possess the emotive (and, thus, ulti-
mately transformative) power inherent in
metaphor.
Assuming, then, that scientific meta-
phor, just as religious metaphor, has the po-
tential to inform ideology and ethics, the
caveat that must be addressed is the rel-
evance of scientific metaphor. How can sci-
ence provide narratives that are relevant to
a popular audience, relevant enough to ef-
fect changes in attitudes and activity? A
good deal of work has been done on maxi-
mizing relevance of religious language.
Feminist theologies, for instance, often
ground themselves on the assertion that
many traditional religious metaphors are
rooted in a male-centered contextual frame-
work and lack, therefore, the contextual ef-
fect needed to make them maximally rel-
evant to female believers. Discussions in
religious circles concerning increasingly
"inclusive language," thus, refers directly
to attempts to increase the relevance of re-
ligious metaphor through increasing con-
textual effects. Similar questions must be
posed in the scientific context. The diffi-
culty of processing effort is intuitively noted
among science writers, as evidenced in the
extraordinarily high frequency of transfer
metaphors. The issue of how scientific
metaphor can maximize its relevance by ac-
tively addressing contextual effects must
also be taken into consideration, and it is
here that the ultimate efficiency of scien-
tific language in shaping ideologies may be
determined.
How do scientists engage in this maxi-
mization of relevance? I now present a case
study of a particular scientific metaphor, to
examine the different ways in which scien-
tists have constructed language to inform a
general audience, and the issues that these
differences raise for the possibility of truly
transformative scientific narratives and the
responsibility of scientists in actively formu-
lating such narratives.
A case study: Gaia theory
Gaia theory is the brainchild of James
E. Lovelock, stemming initially from his
work in the 1960s for NASA on the exami-
nation of possibilities of life on other plan-
ets in the solar system, particularly Mars. 25
Through observations of atmospheric con-
ditions on Earth and other planets, as well
as through modeling of atmospheric condi-
tions on a hypothetical Earth devoid of life,
Lovelock came to the conclusion that the
radically non-equilibrium composition of
Earth's atmosphere could result only from
active maintenance by living systems. By
the late '60s, Lovelock had formulated the
following hypothesis:
The Boston Theological Institute 27
The chemical composition of the
atmosphere [of Earth | bears no relation to
the expectations of steady-state chemical
equilibrium. The presence of methane,
nitrous oxide, and even nitrogen in our
present oxidizing atmosphere represents
violation of the rules of chemistry to be
measured in tens of orders of magnitude.
Disequilibria on this scale suggest that
the atmosphere is not merely a biological
product, but more probably a biological
construction. 26
Lovelock's vision was of an entity of
planetary scale, one actively participating in
a homeostatic process that provides for the
maintenance of atmospheric conditions opti-
mal for living systems. The unusually evoca-
tive name for Lovelock's hypothetical super-
system was provided by novelist William
Golding, who recognized the metaphorical
link between a unified planetary-scale en-
tity and the ancient Greek conception of the
Earth goddess. From its inception, then,
Gaia theory has not only played an impor-
tant role in informing scientific research on
planetary ecosystems and global homeosta-
sis, but has also served as an unusually com-
plex model for the role of metaphor in sci-
entific discourse.
The utilization of Gaia is, perhaps, one
of the most extraordinary examples of sci-
entific transfer metaphor available.
Lovelock originally defined Gaia as
a complex entity involving the Earth's
biosphere, atmosphere, oceans, and soil;
the totality constituting a feedback or
cybernetic system which seeks an
optimal physical and chemical environ-
ment for life on this planet. 27
This proposition differs so radically from the
metaphorical proposition "the planet Earth
is like the ancient Greek Earth goddess," that
it is hard to imagine Lovelock's justification
in choosing the metaphor. It is clear from
his own descriptions of the early phases of
the theory that Gaia was chosen both for its
ability to reduce the processing effort asso-
ciated with the complex scientific concepts
embedded within his hypothesis, and also
for the explicit contextual relevance pos-
sessed by the concept of the Earth goddess.
Lovelock's discussions of Gaia theory
are replete with depictions of the Earth as an
"organism," as the "living planet", or as "a
total planetary being." 28 His personal inter-
pretations of his own scientific observations
suggest that the resemblance between, on the
one hand, the complex integration of non-
living and living systems on a global scale
and, on the other hand, a single living organ-
ism were sufficient to warrant the use of such
transfer metaphors. It is, in part, this organ-
ismic unity that is communicated in the uti-
lization of the Gaia metaphor. In addition,
the language of Gaia seems to argue not only
for a planetary-scale identity, but also for a
planetary-scale agency. The idea that the
Earth participates actively and intentionally
in the homeostatic regulation of its atmo-
sphere in a way that is optimally conducive
to the maintenance of life is another integral
aspect of Lovelock's conception of Gaia.
This idea of purposeful action is, in many
ways, a teleological interpretation of the un-
likelihood of attaining such optimal condi-
tions without some sense of intentionality.
The metaphor of Gaia thus implicitly con-
veys the aspect of agency inherent in
Lovelock's personal rendering of the scien-
tific evidence for his theory. What becomes
clear, then, is that Lovelock's adoption of the
Gaia metaphor is intended to convey implicit
information that is not inherent to the data
—
in other words, information that does not
belong to the domain of the referent.
In retrospect, Lovelock could not have
chosen a more effective metaphor. Not only
has Gaia stimulated a growing debate within
the scientific community over the various
aspects of homeostatic regulation on a plan-
etary scale (including the organization of
international conferences on the subject, the
second of which was held in 1996 at Ox-
ford), but it has also insinuated itself into
the public consciousness to a degree that few
other scientific metaphors have. Various
groups dedicated to the kind of holistic on-
tology represented in the Gaia hypothesis
have actively appropriated the metaphor.
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Most particularly, social action groups have
employed Gaia to further environmental and
ecological consciousness and to stress the
importance of acting toward the Earth in a
manner that is commensurate with its
newfound identity as organism or even god-
dess. The metaphor has further found itself
adopted by a variety of "New Age" organi-
zations, which see Gaia as scientific support
for a spiritual and/or mystical association
with the Earth; such personification has
brought Gaia into intimate conversation with
other aspects of New Age movements, spe-
cifically goddess worship. In short, the
Gaia metaphor has stimulated emotional re-
sponses, attitude changes, and human activ-
ity in an almost runaway fashion. 29
The response of scientists to this mas-
sive popular appropriation of Gaia has not
been overwhelmingly positive. Lovelock
himself has turned away from his original
metaphor, now adopting the language of
Many within the scientific community
argue that Gaia is metaphor gone bad.
So radical a transfer metaphor has
imparted information that was never
intended, and the subsequent distortions
of the message have been so great that
the popular conception ofGaia theory
no longer bears any relation to the
science it was meant to communicate.
"geophysiology," a metaphor that maintains
the association of the Earth with an organis-
mic unity, but severs connections with the
concepts of personality and spirituality that
have become intimately tied to the popular
conception of the Gaia metaphor. Lynn
Margulis, one of the few early supporters of
Lovelock's theory and an important contribu-
tor in her own right, vehemently opposes the
popular distortions of the scientific basis of
Gaia theory by "anti-science and anti-intel-
lectual folks." 3" "Gaia is no vague, quaint
notion of a mother Earth who nurtures us.
The Gaia hypothesis is science." 31 Margulis
sees it as important to stress the scientific
basis of Gaia theory and the value of the
theory in promoting a research program. She
notes that the affinity of New Age groups
for Gaia and the fact that the metaphor stimu-
lates in the public consciousness direct as-
sociations with mythic beliefs subject the
theory to the criticism of being "unscien-
tific."
Her fears are likely not unfounded.
Lovelock and Margulis belong to a relatively
small group of scientists who support what
is known as "strong" Gaia theory, only one
of many theories that fall under the rubric of
Gaia theory as a whole. In its strong form,
the theory suggests an active role of the liv-
ing planetary supersystem in maintaining
conditions optimal for life.
Other forms range from
"influential" Gaia, which
accepts that living systems
influence such abiotic plan-
etary-scale functions as at-
mospheric composition
and temperature, a hypoth-
esis that is widely accepted
and described by Margulis
as "old news": to "teleo-
logical" and "optimizing"
Gaia theories, which com-
prise the "strong" Gaia sup-
ported by Lovelock and
Margulis. 32 It is perhaps
not surprising that strong
Gaia theory has encountered resistance from
the scientific community, given that
community's tendency to eschew language
of teleology in explaining natural phenom-
ena. The struggle for strong Gaia supporters
within the scientific community appears to
be difficult enough, without accusations that
the theory lends itself to spiritual and mysti-
cal interpretations of planetary systems. 33
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One thing that is clear is that scientific
metaphor lies at the heart of this debate. How
do the metaphors through which science is
communicated to a general audience alter the
science itself? When does the acceptable
science of cybernetic homeostatic systems on
a planetary scale cease to be science and start
to become New Age spirituality or environ-
mental rhetoric? On the ™
one hand, it is possible to
argue that the Gaia hy-
pothesis represents scien-
tific metaphor at its very
best. Within the scientific
community, the ambigu-
ities implicit in the asso-
ciation of Lovelock's data
with the Earth goddess
have stimulated ferocious
debate and encouraged a
great deal of research de-
signed to specify more convincingly the na-
ture of the planetary homeostatic tendency.
As far as a more general audience is con-
cerned, Gaia demonstrates conclusively that
Wilson is right—scientific language can (and
does) possess the same kind of transforma-
tive power that religious narrative can pro-
vide. Gaia has altered human attitudes to-
ward the planet at large and, in doing so, has
stimulated human activity commensurate
with those attitudes.
On the other hand, however, many
within the scientific community argue that
Gaia is metaphor gone bad. So radical a
transfer metaphor has imparted information
that was, in fact, never intended; and the sub-
sequent distortions of the message have been
so great that the popular conception of Gaia
theory no longer bears any relation to the
science it was meant to communicate.
In this new light, how are Wilson's claims
to be read, that science "retold as poetry" can
provide the foundations for narratives with
transformative power? Certainly Lovelock's
Gaia represents science retold as poetry. Is it
just too poetic? Metaphor, through its implicit
and emotional information content, may be
seen intentionally to invite interpretation.
The danger of metaphor is that it also in-
vites ^//^interpretation, or as one linguist
puts it, "surplus interpretation." 34 Effec-
tive metaphor can convey in a relevant fash-
ion the information present in the original,
non-metaphoric proposition. But it also al-
ways conveys more. To say that the mito-
The ambiguity and imprecision of
scientific metaphor is both the means
to the construction ofpowerfully emo-
tive scientific language and the means
to the potential obfuscation of the
concepts it is meant to convey.
chondrion is the power plant of the cell con-
veys, in a processing-friendly and contex-
tually effective way, information regarding
the role of the mitochondrion in cell me-
tabolism. But it also provides implicit in-
formation that potentially misinforms the
interpreter regarding the nature of the mi-
tochondrion. So with Gaia theory, and so
also, potentially, with Wilson's metaphor of
humanity as a gene pool. This ability to
convey misinformation is an inescapable as-
pect of metaphorical language, and its con-
sideration has important implications for the
possibility of formulating transformative
scientific narratives. The ambiguity and im-
precision of scientific metaphor is both the
means to the construction of powerfully
emotive scientific language, and the means
to the potential obfuscation of the concepts
it is meant to convey.
The problem of constructing meaning-
ful scientific narratives is, thus, a delicate
balancing act, between providing contex-
tually effective and understandable meta-
phors on the one hand, and maintaining pre-
cision and scientific rigor on the other.
What the present understanding of meta-
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phorical language suggests is that science
cannot forego the former if it is to provide
language that is meaningful and potent, in
the sense of establishing effective models
for reality. This function of scientific lan-
guage relies heavily on metaphor to con-
vey implicit and emotive information con-
tent to the interpreter.
Lynn Margulis and other scientists who
oppose the distortions of Gaia theory that
accompany its appropriation by various en-
vironmental and New Age groups present an
important critique of scientific language, and
in particular of Wilson's claims that it can
stand beside religious language in molding
human attitudes toward reality. Yes, it
works; but what results can hardly be called
science! If science wishes to play a role in
shaping ideologies, however, its reaction
must not be to insulate itself from a general
audience or readership by limiting the ac-
cessibility of its language. Only by an ac-
tive participation in the discussion and re-
evaluation of scientific metaphor, can sci-
ence play such a role. It is not enough to
chastise the "environmentalists and reli-
giously-inclined people... [for] giving Gaia
a distinctly nonscientific connotation." 35
After all, if such people bring nonscientific.
surplus meaning to scientific metaphor, they
are doing only what the very nature of meta-
phor invites them to do. It is necessary,
rather, to enter directly into discussion with
such people and actively establish new meta-
phors that better reflect the scientific reality
and yet retain the ability to motivate emo-
tionally and to stimulate positive activity. If
science is to enter into the game of contrib-
uting to the construction of human ideolo-
gies, then it must come ready to play. Meta-
phor is science's most powerful tool in its
attempts to shape human thought and action,
but it is one that must be handled with care.
Responsible scientific metaphor and
contemporary ideologies
It seems, then, that scientific language
is in no way inherently incapable of provid-
ing meaningful and transformative narra-
tives. Despite the deeply technical and spe-
cialized nature of much of today's science,
and despite accusations from its detractors
of coldness, detachment, or even nihilism,
science has the capacity to spin tales that
possess real meaning and ideological value.
Perhaps the reason behind such impassioned
statements against science is the misconcep-
tion that science deals exclusively in facts.
And facts, as we all know, are cold and hard.
Facts alone are inert and unreactive. They
lack the capacity to draw out the emotions,
to make action imperative. Science, how-
ever, does not trade in mere fact. Scientific
facts are communicated in language, and (for
the most part) the language of science is the
same language used in any communication.
It is part of the job of the scientist to effect
such transformation of fact, to turn simple
observations of the world into accounts of
what our world is like. And in doing so, fact
is potentially transformed, tlirough language,
into narrative that is moving, engaging, and
even, as Wilson puts it, "sacred."
But this task oftransformation is not one
to be taken lightly. To suggest that scien-
tific fact can form the basis of ideologies and
ethical systems is not to say that it is a simple
matter of observing the world and translat-
ing those observations into parables that help
us lead our lives. The construction of scien-
tific metaphor is an active pursuit, and when
one combines the emotive power of such
metaphor with the fact that intentional mis-
information is inherent in any metaphoric
construct, the danger becomes readily ap-
parent. It is one thing for a first year bio-
chemistry student to have over-anthropomor-
phized the mitochondrion, or even for a New
Age mystic to claim 'scientific support
overzealously for an Earth goddess. It seems
quite another when one encounters such in-
terpretations as the following:
I wish very much that the wrong
people could be prevented entirely
from breeding; and when the evil
nature of these people is sufficiently
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flagrant, this should be done. Crimi-
nals should be sterilized and feeble-
minded persons forbidden to leave
offspring behind. The emphasis
should be on getting desirable people
to breed. 36
It is tempting to ascribe such words to the mar-
ginal eugenic fanatics of the world. These par-
ticular words happen to come from Theodore
Roosevelt. And the Presi- ,m
dent was not alone; many
other prominent and well-
respected individuals have
provided the world with
similarly spectacular state-
ments. Linus Pauling, one
of the greatest minds the
field of biology has ever
known, winner of not one,
but two, Nobel Prizes (one
for Peace), once remarked
(apparently quite earnestly)
that in the future all individuals should be
branded with an encoded representation of
their exact genotype, so that
two young people carrying the same
seriously defective gene in single dose
would recognize the situation at first
sight and would refrain from falling in
love with one another. 37
Is any more definitive evidence needed
to support claims of the ideological potency
of scientific language? What the above state-
ments indicate more than anything else is
the way in which the metaphor of "natural
selection" has insinuated itself convincingly
into popular thought, and its success in mo-
tivating worldviews and ethical systems
throughout the Western world. It is inter-
esting to note that in Geertz' definition of
religion, he considers that religious symbol
systems establish conceptions about reality
and proceed in
clothing these conceptions with such an
aura of factuality that the moods and
motivations seem uniquely realistic. 38
And this is precisely what has happened with
"natural selection." This phrase is not fact;
it is a metaphor adopted to communicate a
diverse set of observations about the natural
world in a manner that is relevant to a gen-
eral audience. Most evolutionary biologists
will rail regarding the inaccuracy of consid-
ering "natural selection" as an intentional
process, with nature acting as a conscious
designer, weeding the bad out of the good,
with a mind to ineluctable progress up the
Science may have a great deal to
learnfrom religion. Though reli-
gious narrative demonstrably plays a
powerful positive role in shaping
human lives, it has also provided
many striking examples of the poten-
tial dangers of untamed metaphor,
evolutionary ladder. Such conceptions are
the motive behind a number of "intelligent
design" formulations of the evolutionary
process, which are frowned upon by the vast
majority of biologists. And yet the primary
metaphor for evolution is this one of "natu-
ral selection," and it is not difficult to see
how this metaphor conveys the implicit in-
formation of intentionality.
It is, furthermore, not difficult to see
how this surplus interpretation of intention-
ality has informed ideology. If nature can
serve as the agent of evolutionary progress,
then why can't we? Selection is a process
with which humans are inherently familiar;
it possesses great contextual effect. It draws
out such emotionally laden concepts as
choice between better and worse, and the
possibility of active improvement. It invites
human agency. And given such invitations,
combined with the potency of the "natural
selection" metaphor and its "aura of factu-
ality" (stemming from its association with
scientific "fact"), it is not at all surprising
that humanbeings should have begun to take
the process of selection upon themselves.
And from here, it is only a matter of detail
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before we are potentially faced with human
ideologies, strongly informed by scientific
language, which confront us with pressing
moral and ethical dilemmas.
Scientific metaphor is, thus, subject to
every criticism that has been directed at other
traditionally recognized sources of ideology
and ethics. In this sense, science may have
a great deal to learn from religion. This older
sibling of science, after all, has been in the
business of shaping ideologies for some time
now; and, though religious narrative demon-
strably plays a powerful positive role in shap-
ing human lives, it has also provided many
striking examples of the potential dangers
of untamed metaphor. What modern cri-
tiques of religious language teach us can and
must be equally applied to scientific lan-
guage. Although the latter is capable of simi-
larly contributing positive transformative
narratives, it can also provide equally dam-
aging worldviews, can offer metaphors that
are equally exclusive and non-contextual for
minority groups, and can provide equally
powerful motivation for human activity that
borders on inhumanity. The claim that sci-
ence can form the basis of a positive new
mythos is just as much a claim that science
can form the basis of a negative one.
The important realization, then, is that
scientifically based ideologies are a function
of scientific language, and not a function of
scientific fact. Scientific language has the
capacity to translate the concepts of science
into a form that moves and motivates, that
shapes human thought and encourages hu-
man activity. But scientific fact itself
underdetermines ideology—no unique
worldview or ethical system can be gener-
ated from the vast library of cold, hard facts.
Those various worldviews and ethical sys-
tems that are so generated must, therefore,
be subject to the same scrutiny that any mod-
em ideology is subject to; there is no exemp-
tion granted for being derived from science.
A detailed look at scientific language dem-
onstrates convincingly that there is no rea-
son to leave science out in the cold when it
comes to the important task of shaping con-
temporary ideologies and ethics. Science
can become an integral participant in this
conversation. But it must do so with a will-
ingness to engage non-scientists actively in
constructing metaphor that is scientifically
accurate and generally relevant. And it must
recognize also that a basis in scientific fact
does not a good ethical system make. Sci-
entific and religious narrative alike must be
scrutinized in an effort to provide positive
meaning and direction for our species now
and into the future.
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